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ii

STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 52 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

in

10

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the State of
Utah is appropriate pursuant to Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and order entered in the Third
Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, judge presiding, following a trial
without a jury on September 9, 1988.

The court determined that

a lease agreement between the respective parties herein, for
outdoor advertising purposes, was no longer in effect and that
the defendant/appellant, Reagan Outdoor Advertising (hereinafter
"Reagan"),

was

therefore

trespassing

on

the

plaintiffs'/appellees', John W. and Helene B. Jarman (hereinafter
"Jarmans"), property.
In addition, this appeal is taken from the trial court's
denial of Reagan's motion to amend the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered after the trial.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to amend its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law to more accurately reflect the
evidence presented during the trial?
2.

Did

advertising

the trial court err in finding that the outdoor
lease agreement, previously
1

executed

between the

parties, was ambiguous with regard to the extent of Reagan's
leasehold?
3.

If the trial court did not err in finding the extent of

Reaganfs leasehold ambiguous, did it nevertheless err in finding
that Reagan1s leasehold only extended to that portion of Jarmans'
property upon which the outdoor advertising structures stood at
the time the most recent lease agreement was executed?
4.

Did the trial court err in finding that the defendant was

in trespass of Jarmans1 property and in ordering the removal of
Reagan's outdoor advertising structures?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1971, Mr. Richard Paxman, representing Galaxy Outdoor
Advertising, Reagan's predecessor in interest (R. 47), contacted
the

owners

of

the

Hi-Ute

Ranch

in

Summit

County, Jarmans'

predecessors in interest (R. 76) , to negotiate a lease of the HiUte

property

in

order

to

emplace

two

outdoor

advertising

structures (R. 41) . Ultimately, an agreement was reached and two
separate lease documents (the "1971 leases") were executed (R.
44 and 45).
Subsequently, two outdoor advertising structures were built
on locations adjacent to State Highway 224 picked out by Mr.
2

Paxman (R. 42). These same structures were on location at the
time the Jarmans purchased the property, which contains some 130
acres

(sometime

existence, having
property.

in

1980);

and,

seen the

they

were

signs before

aware

of

their

they purchased

the

Mr. Jarman eventually contacted Galaxy Outdoor to

advise them of the change in ownership (R. 209-10, 11).
In 1981, Mr. Terry K. Reid, representing Reagan, entered into
discussions with Mr. Jarman to renew the lease agreement for the
structures (R. 47). In 1982, the leasehold was renewed with the
execution of a lease document

(the "1982 lease")

replace the two previous documents.

(R. 86) to

The 1982 lease agreement

has become the subject of the instant action.
The
Jarmans,

description
pursuant

of
to

the

property

the

1982

being

lease,

leased

from

incorporated

the

those

descriptions found on the 1971 leases (R. 48). No address for,
or better description of, the premises existed at the time the
1971

leases

were

prepared

so

a general

description

of

the

proposed locations where the structures would be emplaced was
used (R. 42).

Such a method was a common means of identifying

properties without addresses at that time (R. 209-37) . There is
no address for the property even now; it is generally referred
to as Kimball Junction (R. 74) . Likewise, there was no specific,
or exact, description of the location of the structures, only a
general description, approximately identified by using monuments
(R. 209-14, 15, 25, 28, 37) .

3

It was the Jarmansf intention to allow Reagan to have two
outdoor advertising sign locations next to State Highway 224 (R.
209-29).
Reagan continued to use the leasehold premises and to pay
the agreed rental to the Jarmans for the locations from the
execution of the 1982 lease to that point in time where the
Jarmans refused to accept payment

and initiated

the

instant

action (R. 48).
In 1987, the State of Utah began

the widening of

State

Highway 224 in the vicinity of Kimball Junction after acquiring
from the Jarmans a right-of-way of approximately 10 to 30 feet
(R. 209-16).
trial.)

(The precise amount was never revealed during the

The newly acquired State right-of-way took a portion of

the Jarman property upon which the outdoor advertising structures
were located

(R. 209-41, 42).

However, neither structure was

completely located within the new right-of-way (R. 209-17, 41).
The State, through Mr. Dear Holbrook, made

a request

to

Reagan to have the structures moved off the right-of-way (R. 20939) . Reagan did move the signs; moving them just far enough away
form the highway so that they would no longer be in the State's
right-of-way and to be completely located on the property of the
Jarmans1

(R. 49).

The original description of the location of the structures
as found

in the

1971 and

1982 leases still describes

their

location (R. 42, 49). Mr. Jarman admitted during the trial that
this is indeed the situation (R. 209-26, 27).
4

Reagan was paid by the State to relocate, not remove the
structures (R. 209-67f 68).
The

Jarmans

took

the position

that the 1982 lease only

allowed Reagan to maintain the two outdoor advertising structures
in the exact locations that these structures occupied when the
lease

was

then

renewed.

They

contended

that

moving

the

structures, even the few feet that they were, in fact, moved,
constituted a trespass.

In their Complaint, filed December 10,

1987, they sought removal of the structures and monetary damages.
The claim for money damages was withdrawn at the time of trial
(R. 209-3) .
Prior

to trial Reagan made a motion for the entry of a

Summary Judgment in its favor.

This motion was denied.

Trial

was thereafter held in Summit County, the Honorable Judge Michael
R. Murphy presiding, on September 9, 1988.

The Court entered a

judgment in favor of the Jarmans, ordering the structures removed
and awarding the Jarmans their costs.
The

Court

also

made

and

entered

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law in which it determined that the 1982 lease was
ambiguous and Reagan was in trespass.

Reagan made a motion to

amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law; specifically
directing the motion to specific Findings and Conclusions (R.
Ill), and identifying the discrepancies that needed correcting.
This motion was summarily denied.

Reagan thereafter appealed to

the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The 1982 outdoor advertising lease agreement is a renewal
of the original 1971 lease agreements executed by the respective
predecessors in interest of the current parties.

The extent of

Reagan's leasehold interest is clearly defined within the four
corners of the instrument.
ambiguous.
at least,

In this respect the lease is not

Reagan was entitled to move its structures, within,
the

same

general

emplaced, to accommodate

area that

they

were

originally

the widening of State Highway 224,

without suffering a loss of said leasehold.

The trial court

erred in determining the lease ambiguous in this regard and in
ordering the removal of the structures.
The evidence presented during the trial clearly established
the intent, and understanding, of the parties with regard to the
extent of the leasehold.
trial court's ruling.
clear error.

This evidence flies in the face of the

In this respect the trial court committed

Reagan is not in trespass of Jarmans' property and

is entitled to remain thereon.
The trial court's Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law,
are not fully reflective of the evidence presented, nor are they
completely accurate.

It was error for the trial court to not

amend the Findings and Conclusions, as requested by Reagan, to
render them more accurate and complete.

Corrected Findings and

Conclusions will not be supportive of the trial court's judgment.
The true reason for the court's ruling was revealed by the
Court after the trial. The basis for its decision, it seems, was
6

for reasons other than the evidence presentedf and the issues
before it.

In this respect, as well, the trial court committed

clear error in reaching a decision favorable to the Jarmans.

ARGUMENT
I

Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Amend the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Should Have Been Granted
Following the trial and the entry of the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Reagan filed its motion
to amend.

The Findings (and Conclusions) being challenged were

specifically set forth along with the basis therefore (R. Ill) .
Reagan made reference to the evidence presented during the trial
in support of each point.

Despite this, and a clear basis

existing to justify making the proposed amendments the trial
court denied the motion in its entirety (R. 131) .

The Court

explained, in making the ruling, that "I didn't see anything
different . . ." (R. 209-103, 105).
Findings nos. 2 and 3 state that the 1982 lease agreement was
for "specific locations" or "specific sites" (R. 104) . And, this
is what the trial court stated following the trial (R. 209-98) .
But this is not in harmony with the facts in evidence.

1) Mr.

Paxman testified that a property address would have been used to
describing the leasehold, rather than a landmark (or monument),

7

had the property had an address (R. 209-37).
description

as

description:

set

forth

in

the

1982

2) The leasehold

lease

is

a general

"State Hwy 224 across from state Hwy sheds s/o

Kimball Jet & State Hwy 224 300' s/o State Hwy shed, s/o Kimball
Jet"

(R. 86) .

utilize

3) The leasehold

a "remaining portion"

interest

of

allowed

the property

Reagan to

should

it be

necessary to move the structures to accommodate property building
and development (R. 86).

4) The possibility of relocating the

structures was discussed by the parties during the negotiations
that resulted in the 1982 lease renewal (R. 209-58, 59). These
Findings are key points in resolving the case. In light of the
evidence presented amending these Findings to provide that the
leasehold

allowed

Reagan to maintain

its

structures

in

the

general vicinity of the landmarks or "monuments" described is
appropriate.
It

was

leasehold

(and
only

is) the
extended

Jarmans'

position

to

property

their

that
upon

the

Reagan

which

the

structures were exactly located when the 1982 lease was executed.
This is reflected in Finding no. 4.
know, even at

the time of trial,

Yet, Mr. Jarman did not

just where

the signs were

originally located (R. 209-14, 15, 28), how much of his property
the State of Utah acquired (R. 209-16, 17), and where the signs
were moved to (R. 209-17,); except that they were still within
the leasehold description.
Finding no. 4 goes on to state

that it was the parties1

intention to continue the leasehold for the existing locations
8

only.

But testimony given during the trial clearly shows that

the parties had discussions concerning the possible relocation
of the signs (R. 209-54) and, Mr. Jarman stated that he never
told Reagan

that he wanted

the lease to apply only

to the

specific piece of property that the structures then occupied (R.
209-25) . In fact, Mr. Jarman testified that it was his intention
to allow Reagan to have two signs next to the State highway (R.
209-29) !

It is clear error for the trial court not to amend

Finding no. 4 to state that even if it was Mr. Jarman's intent
to so limit the leasehold that this was never communicated to
Reagan, that he did intend for Reagan to have two signs next to
the highway,

and

that

there were

discussions

regarding

the

possibility of relocating the structures.
For the purpose of this Appeal Reagan asks that the Court
look specifically at but two other points with regard to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

Findings nos. 5 and 8.

In its Finding no. 5 the trial court found that the lease was
ambiguous;

at

lease

insofar

description (R. 209-97) .

as

it related

to

the

property

The appellant will discuss this point

in detail in the argument below.
Finding no. 8 states that Reagan moved the structures, or
"billboards," from the locations they occupied to other locations
on Jarmans' property.

The implication from this is that the

structures were moved to a completely different portion of the
Jarman property; to an area that the Jarmans never contemplated
would be used for outdoor advertising purposes.
9

(Which is, of

course, what the Jarmans wanted the trial court to think.)

From

the evidence presented during the trial this is clearly not the
case.

Only a portion of the structures were moved; just enough

to remove them from the State's new right-of-way.

In fact, the

structures are not only still within the property description
that

Jarman

first

observed

them

at

when

he

purchased

the

property, but Mr. Jarman admitted at trial that this is the case
(R. 209-26, 27). It was clear error for the trial court not to
amend Finding no. 8 to state

that

the structures were only

partially relocated.
The trial court's Findings of Fact (and the Conclusions of
Law

they

support)

presented

during

go against
the

trial

therefore, clearly erroneous.
aside. Rule 52

the
of

clear

the

weight

instant

of

case

evidence
and

are,

In this regard they should be set

(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See also

Sampson v. Richins, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 55 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) and General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co., 766 P.2d
429, 98 UAR 53, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

This Court should set

them aside and remand the case for the entry of amended Findings
that are supported by the evidence.
The

Conclusions

of

Law

should

be

reviewed

under

the

"correction of error" standard identified in the case of Bailey
v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 100 UAR 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and be
corrected to conform to the evidence presented.

10

II
The 1982 Lease Agreement is Not Ambiguous
The extent of Reagan's outdoor advertising leasehold can
be resolved from the four corners of the 1982 lease document
without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence.

The pertinent

terms and provisions are contained therein allowing the Court to
determine, as a matter of law, the rights and liabilities of
respective parties.
The 1982 lease agreement states, in pertinent part:
. . . The lessor does hereby grant and convey
to the lessee and its assigns and successors, the
exclusive right to use the following described property for the purpose of erecting and maintaining
thereon outdoor advertising structures . . . as may
be desired by lessee for a term of ten years .
located in the county of Summit, State of Utah and
more particularly described as follows: State Hwy
224 across from state Hwy sheds s/o Kimball Jet. &
State Hwy 224 300' s/o State Hwy shed, s/o Kimball
Jet. . .
. . . Lessor shall have the right to terminate
this lease . . . if : (a) Lessor builds or develops
on the property where the sign(s) structure(s) is
situated; or (b) In the event Lessor sells the
premises, the buyer of said premises has the right
to terminate this lease . . . Lessee will remove its
sign(s) . . . If any portion of the property is not
utilized for such buildings, Lessee has the option
to use the remaining portion on the same terms. . .
(emphasis added).
From the stated provisions it is clear that the Jarmans gave to
Reagan the right to both erect and maintain outdoor advertising
structures on their property in Summit County at two locations
along State Highway 224 for a term of ten years.

11

One location

was across from the State's highway sheds; the other was 300 feet
south of the sheds.
There is no other limitation embodied in the document with
regard to the locations of the structures-

There is no other

reasonable interpretation that can be given the agreement- The
lease

agreement

must

be

enforced

in

accordance

with

the

intentions manifest by the language used by the parties. Ephraim
Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958).

To do

otherwise would be to allow the courts to add some term, or
terms, to the agreement that the parties could, had they wanted
to, put in the agreement themselves.

Both appellate courts in

Utah have made it clear that they will not inject ambiguity into
a contract where no exists in order to save a party from what,
in retrospect, seems an ill-advised

agreement.

Crowther v.

Carter, 767 P.2d 138, 99 UAR 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Dalton
v. Jerico Const. Co. , 642 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982).

Six years after

entering into the lease agreement with Reagan the Jarmans may
have changed their minds with regard to allowing the leasehold,
but that does not excuse them

from holding

to the original

agreement.
The lease agreement further provides that the structures may
be relocated on Jarmans' remaining property should the signs
need be removed because of building and development, or in the
event of sale.
relocate

the

If, as the Jarmans claim, there was no right to
structures

anywhere

because

the

leasehold

was

limited exclusively to the locations the structures occupied at
12

the

time

the

1982 lease

was executed

then

this clause

was

unnecessary and should have been stricken.
The language used in an agreement is ambiguous only if
the words used

to express the meaning

and intention of

the

parties are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be
understood to reach two or more plausible meanings.

American

Bonding Co. v. Nelson, 763 P.2d 814, 94 UAR 42, 43-44 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).

There is no other plausible meaning!

The interpretation of this lease agreement can be determined
by the words of the agreement and is, therefore, not ambiguous.
The intent of the parties can be culled from the terms found
within the lease.
The interpretation of this lease agreement is a question of
law.

Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture, 90

Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24

(Sup. Ct. 1988).

Because

the lease

agreement is not ambiguous this Court need not give the trial
court's

ruling

correctness.

any

particular

weight,

but

review

it

for

Cecala v. Thorlev, 764 P.2d 643, 96 UAR 15, 16

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

See also, Heller v. U.S. Rock Wool Co.,

762 P.2d 1104, 93 UAR 8, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and Kimball v.
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).

It is clear from the

foregoing that the ruling of the trial court was not correct and
needs be overturned.

13

Ill
Even If The Trial Court Did Not Err In Ruling
That The 1982 Outdoor Advertising Lease Was Ambiguous
It Was Error To Find That The Leasehold Was Limited
To The Exact Locations That The Signs Occupied At The
Time This Lease Was Exected
It is well settled that the standard of review of a trial
court's ruling on a contract found to be ambiguous is that this
Court must find that ruling "clearly erroneous."

Bailey v. Call,

supra., Crowther v. Carter, supra., Power Systems & Controls v.
Keith's Electrical Constr. Co, 765 P.2d 5, 97 UAR 34 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
to inject

But, as discussed above, it is improper for a court
ambiguity

in order to

"save" a party.

Crowther,

supra. , at 99 UAR p. 31.
Nevertheless, if the 1982 lease agreement is ambiguous the
extrinsic evidence presented during the trial of the instant case
was more than sufficient to establish that Reagan had the right
to relocate its structures in the vicinity of their original
locations without a loss of the leasehold and without being in
trespass of the Jarman property.
Much of the evidence supporting the above position, extracted
from the record (mainly the record made during the trial) has
already been stated above. These facts, in review, are: 1) The
1982 lease agreement allows Reagan to relocate its signs; 2) no
exact description for the location of the Reagan structures was
affixed

to the

1971 leases

and no attempt

fix their

exact

locations was made at the time the 1982 lease was executed; 3)
14

the description of the property being leased still matches the
description of the structures' locations after the relocation;
4) Mr. Jarman agrees that this is, in fact, the situation, that
the structures

are still

located

according

to the

property

description; 5) it was the Jarmans1 intention to allow Reagan to
have two signs next to State Highway 224; 6) Reagan was paid by
the

State

amendment

to

relocate,

to, or

not

remove,

deletion of, the

the

structures; 7)

1982 lease agreement

no
was

accomplished to otherwise limit Reagan's ability to relocate the
structures or to evidence that the Jarmans did not intend that
Reagan should be limited to only those exact locations that the
structures then occupied; 8) the Jarmans still own the property
the

Reagan

understood

structures
that

are

located

it was strictly

upon;

9)

Reagan

limited with regard

never
to

the

location of its signs; 10) only a portion of the sign structures
were in the new State right-of-way and only a partial relocation
of the structures was accomplished in any event.
Only the mere statement by Mr. Jarman that he "intended" the
lease

to be

limited

to

opposition to the above.

sign

locations

of

1982

stands

in

This statement is not supported by any

other evidence and is directly controverted by Reagan and the
1982 lease document.

If nothing else the Jarmans have failed to

carry the burden of proof required of them in a case of this
nature.
The Appellant has met its burden and shown that the ruling
of the trial court goes against the "clear weight of evidence,"
15

and is "clearly erroneous."

Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 104 Utah

Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

The evidence presented

during the trial is insufficient to support the finding made.
General Glass Corp., supra., 98 UAR at p. 55.
At

the

close

of

the

trial

proceedings

the

lower

court

indicated that it was concerned that by its terms the 1982 lease
might automatically be continued to the year 2002 and seemed to
have some concern that this would cause future contention between
the respective parties if the court were to rule for Reagan. Now,
the lower court did state that this was not a reason for its
ruling, but that "[T]here will be peace now . . ." (R. 209-99.)
This issue (of an extension to the initial lease term) was
never

before

proceedings.

the court

and

not

interjected

into the

trial

If this issue did not enter into the trial court's

decision why was it even discussed?

CONCLUSION
For those reasons set forth above the defendant/appellant,
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, respectfully requests that this Court
1) overturn the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of
Summit County holding that Reagan is trespassing on the property
of the plaintiffs'/appellees ' ; 2) overturn the District Court's
order that Reagan remove its two outdoor advertising structures
from Jarmans' property at Kimball Junction; and 3) remand the
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case to the lower court for the entry of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law consistent herewith.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ "~~ day of May, 1989.

Douglas T. Hall
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served 4 copies of Appellant's Brief
upon the Appellees by causing same to be delivered to the offices
of Appellees1 attorneys of record, Ronald E. Nehring and Don R.
Schow, at City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East Fourth South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, this

/^
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day of May, 1989
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4180 SOUTH STATE STREET - PHONE 262-2531
SAIT LAKE-CltreijfAH 84107

ioilars

In consideration of the sum
per annum, pavau^ as ion.

the undersigned lessor, having full right and authority in the premises, hereby
leases to the Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., lessee, its successors op assigns,, ex-

i

dusively with the privilege of access to and upon the premises, known as A. SS£

KT*-**

?do

*z

u

X

;o * */~ f raJ<

XL

*r>c/

st

for the erection and maintenance of advertising signs from the

f/i

1Q

19.>Z-to the

/ <r

day of

y.

{*///<+/

day of

£kZ

Ul

7 A^anH on like terms for the succeeding years, unless terminated as hereinafter

mentioned't. It* i s expressly- agreed/ thafc- the lessor may order the advertising: signs* removed at any time during- the 'lift-"of this contract by giving the lessee thirty days written notice that the property is sold or is to be
imprr ed by the erection of buildings thereon, and in such case, the lessor shall refund, pro-rata, the
unearned portion of prepaid rental, or by the lessee, by giving the lessor thirty days written notice. If,,
in the opinion of tHe lessee, the said space becomes in any way obstructed, this lease may, at the optionof the lessee* be terminated and lessor will refund the unearned portion of prepaid rental. All materials
-placed upon this property under this lease shall remain the property of the lessee and may be removed
by tbe lessee at any time.

Accepted:

Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

*'/f?<&^3'£S/>4gr
Address
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i^axaxw \Jutdoor
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4 1 8 0 SOUTH STATE STREET - PHONE 2 6 2 - 2 5 3 1
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 0 7

—, JO
In consideration of the sum of J ! — ^ _ 1 — £ r t / ' / , / .

, X3-

\ — s *'VKm-&$B£r&

per annum, payable as follows: ^
the undesigned lessor, having full right and authority in the premises, hereby
leases to the Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., lessee, its successors or assigns, exclus:. ely with the privilege of access to and upon the premises kaown A*T &*/

for the erection and maintenance of advertising signs from the
£

•' A

1Q / 7 /

to t h e

-^

^

tey

L

r*tf&£'ltfj

day of

of / - V < S

13 ^ 7 ^ and on like terms for the succeeding years, unless terminated as hereinafter
mentioned.
It'is-'expressly "greed that the lessor-may order the advertising: signs removed at any time during the
life of this contract by giving the lessee thirty days written notice that the property is sold or is to be
improved by the erection of buildings thereon, and in such case, the lessor shall refund, pro-rata, the
unearned portion of prepaid rental, or by the lessee, by giving the lessor thirty days written notice, If,
in the opinion of the lessee, the said space becomes in any way obstructed, this lease may, at the option
of the lessee, be terminated and lessor will refund the unearned portion of prepaid rental. All materials
placed upon this property under this lease shall remain the property of the lessee and may be removed
by the lessee at any time.

Accepted:

Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

A„ant

zfr^fs-fSyg"
Address
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>~~. v^ ^

4180 South'State. Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 £ : . _ ^ "

it Page l.:±f.*~-"^- This agreement madeahd entered[ i n i o V the undersigned lessor, (the "Lessor") and by Reagan Outdoor -$**
i Advertising, (the "Lessee"). Both lessor andjessee acknowledge^the
receipt and sufficiency of good and. .\
Z- valuable consideration
and agree "as
followsi~'v * ~'-: TOv! x*?£,s V _*•*» — '--r^r
-~~
"***?;." ' " "^WF
tM i>
v
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^fta?'-Thie lessor does hereby grantand convey to the lessee and its assigns and successors, the exclusive right to ^ ^
*• use the following describedjp^pe>tyjpr_the purpose of erecting and maintaining thereon outdoor advertising "3^
^structures including such>necesstttycTe<«?es, structures, connections, supports and appurtenances as may^.be "*r
~ desired by lessee for a term of tej^ear>^mmencing on or before "" 1 s t day of FftKruorv Vffi fffiat^:.:
*- option of lessee, upon the^olJiSSr^aescribed
land, together with ingress and egress to and upor&the same, "_
^located in the ^nnfynf^ 1
<?nmm^ t>«..^>.... .w~~»..»,—, State of Utah and more particularly described a s * ^

vw

j^a^is, (Lessee may place on or attach to this instrument, subsequent to execution, a metes and bounds description of the location.) *-^*

'-—- Lessee shall pay lessor the amount of$ ^00,00
annually* payable (monthly, quarterly;'semi-,
annually); however, prior.to construction and obtaining permits by lessee the rental shall be Five Dollars.,
:

-=^;This lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period; thereafter, this.
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period or periods, unlesa
^lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination within ninety days of the end of said term.^ - " 1 ~ ^ '-: ••'•;
Z':~. It is further expressly a^r^etTtna^essee' mayterrmnate this lease by giving written notice and paying a
penalty of one year's rent/at any ftme within thirty days prior to the end of any twelve month period'
subsequent to the commencement date of this lease. Provided further, if the said space becomes obstructed so •
as to lessen the advertising value of any of lessee's signs erected on said premises, or if traffic is diverted or
reduced, or if the use of any such signs is prevented or restricted by law, or if for any reason a building permit'.
^ for erection or modification is refused this lease may, at the option of lessee, be terminated or the rent reduced
• to Five Dollars while said condition exists and in such event lessor shall refund prorata any prepaid "rental for
.the unexpired term. Lessor agrees that no such obstruction insofar as the same is within lessor's control will be
Tpermittd or allowed. Lessor authorizes lessee to trim and cut whatever trees, bushes, brush as it deems
^necessary for unobstructed view of its advertising display.
r- ~- All advertising sighs placed upon the described premises are to remain the property of lessee and may be
removed by lessee at any time. If lessee is prevented by law, or government or military order, or other causes
beyond lessee's control, from illuminating, its signs, the lessee may reduce the rental provided herein by
" one-half with such reduced rental to remain in effect so long as such condition* continues to exist. Lessor shall
have the right to terminate this lease at any time during the term of this lease if: (a)_Lessor builds or develops,
on the property where the sign(s) structurefsT is situated; or (b) In the*event Lessor sells the'premises, "the
buyer of said premises has the right to terminate this lease within thirty (30) days'immediately fojlowing
^recordation of deed of sale, if buyer gives lessee Avritten'hotice of termination.' Lessee will remove'its sfgn(s).
^within thirty (30) days after receiving a written copy of the deed or valid building permit together'with prepaid:"
-unearned rerif. Ifany portion of the property is notntitteedfof such buildings. Lessee has the option to use the^remaining portion on the same terms.--v^*--^^-;.*,''i.«.*a
;;:?. Lessor warrants the title of said leasehold for the term herein mentioned. In the event this lease is not
'renewed or cancelled, lessor agrees that he will not for a period of five years subsequent to the date of
^termination, release said premises to any other advertiser other than lessee for advertising purposes. Inithe
jevent Lessor shall decide aurihg the term of this lease to sell the premises described herein. Lessor shall give
"written notice to Reagan of the terms and price offered by a third party. Reagan shall be entitled for thirty (30)
days to acquire thepremises on the terms and conditions in said notice. If Reagan does not exercise saidrightof
purchase, the Lessor shall not sell the premises on other terms for six (6) months. Thereafter, Reagan shall.
; nave the same right as to any subsequent offer to purchase. It is expressly understood that neither the lessor:
'nor lessee is bound by any stipulations, representations, or agreements not printed or written in this lease.
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Page 1
This agreement made and entered into by the undersigned lessor, (the "Lessor") and by Reagan Outdoor
Advertising, (tht "lessee"*. Both lessor and lessee acknowledge the receipt and sufficiency of good and
valuable consideration and agree as follows:
The lessor does hereby grant and convey to the lessee and its assigns and successors, the exclusive right to
use the following described property for the purpose of erecting and maintaining thereon outdoor advertising
structures including such necessary devices, structures, connections, supports and appurtenances as may be
desired by lessee for a term often years commencing on or before
day of
19
at
option of lessee, upon the following described land, together with ingress and egress to and upon the same,
located in the county of:
State of Utah and more particularly described as
follows:

(Lessee may place on or attach to thif instrument, subsequent to execution a metes and ovjna* description of" the lot^tK.-r.

Lessee shall pay lessor the amount of $
annually, payable (monthly, quarterly, semiannually); however, prior to construction and obtaining permits by lessee the rental shall be Five Dollars.
This lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period; thereafter, this
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period or periods, unless
lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination within ninety days of the end of said term.
It is further expressly agreed that lessee may t e r m i n a t e this lease by giving written notice and paying a
penalty of one year's rent at any time within thirty days prior to the end of any twelve month period
subsequent to the commencement date of this lease. Provided further, if the said space becomes obstructed so
as to lessen the advertising value of any of lessee's signs erected on said premises, or if traffic is diverted or
reduced, or if the use of any such signs is prevented or restricted by law, or if for any reason a building permit
for erection or modification is refused this lease may. at the option of lessee, be terminated or the rent reduced
to Five Dollars while said condition exists and in such event lessor shall refund prorata any prepaid rental for
the unexpired term. Lessor agrees that no such obstruction insofar as the same is within lessor's control will be
permittd or allowed. Lessor authorizes lessee to trim and cut whatever trees, bushes, brush as it deems
necessary for unobstructed view of its advertising display.
AH advertising signs placed upor: the described premises are to remain the property of lessee and may be
removed by lessee at any time. If lessee is prevented by law. or government or military order, or other causes
beyond lessee's control, from illuminating its signs, the lessee may reduce the rental provided herein by
one-half with such reduced rental to remain in effect so long as such condition continues to exist Lessor shall
have the right to terminate this lease at any time during the term of this lease if: (a) Lessor builos or develops
on the property where the sign(s» structure ? is situated: or *h» In the event Lessor sells the premises, the
buyer of said premises has the righ; to terminate this lease within thirty «30» days immediately following
recordation of deed of sale, if buyer gives lessee written notice of termination. Lessee will remove its sign's)
within thirty (30* days after receiving a written copy of the deed or valid building permit together with prepaid
unearned rent. If any portion of the property is not utilized for such buildings. Lessee has the option to use the
remaining portion on the same terms.
Lessor warrants the title of said leasehold for the term herein mentioned. In the event this lease is not
renewed or cancelled, lessor agrees that he will not for a period of five years subsequent u> the date of
termination, release said premise? to any other advertiser other than lessee for advertising purposes In the
event Lessor shall decide during the term of this lease to sell the premises described herein. Lessor shah give
written notice to Reagan of the terms and price offered by a third party. Reagan shall be entitled for thirty i 30)
days to acquire the premises on the terms and conditions in said notice. If Reagan does not exercise said right of
purchase, the Lessor shall not sell the premises on other terms for six <6i months. Thereafter, Reagan shall
nave the same right as to any subsequent offer to purchase. It is expressly understood that neither the lessor
nor lessee is bound by any stipulations, representations, or agreements not printed or written in this lease.
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the heirs, personal representatives,
successors, and assigns of the parties hereto.
Executed this

day of

LESSEE: REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Jon C. Heaton (1444)
Ronald E. Nehring (2374)
Robert G. Wing (4445)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AN£ FOI.
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

[[

\{ ))[F^

\(

JOHN W. JARMAN and HELENE B,
JARMAN,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
COMPANY,

Civil No. 9636
(Judge Michael R. Murphy)

Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on for trial without a
jury before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy sitting in
Coalville, Utah on September 9, 1988. Plaintiffs were
represented by Ronald E. Nehring.
Stanley J. Preston.

Defendant was represented by

The Court received the testimony of

witnesses and documentary evidence.

Having considered the

same, together with the arguments of counsel, the Court,
pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs and defendant entered into a Lease

dated February 1, 1982.

The Lease was drafted in its entirety

by defendant.
2.

The Lease describes two specific locations on

real property owned by the plaintiffs upon which defendant was
authorized to locate two billboards.
3.

Prior to the execution of the Lease between

plaintiffs and defendant, Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., an
entity subsequently acquired by the defendant, entered into two
leases with plaintiffs' predecessor in interest.

Each of these

leases authorized the placement of one billboard on a specific
site — the site occupied by the billboards at the time the Lease
between plaintiffs and defendant was signed.
4.

Based upon the property description in the

February 1982 Lease, the fact that the billDoards were in place
at the time the Lease was signed, and based upon the testimony
of Mr. Jarman that he intended to lease defendant only the
property upon which the billboards were situated, the Court
finds that the parties intended the Lease to continue the right
of the defendant to maintain the billboards in their existing
locations.

5.

The Court finds that the Lease of February 1,

1982 is ambiguous and thus subject to the introduction and
consideration of parol evidence to aid in its interpretation.
6.

The Court finds that plaintiffs did not intend to

grant defendant a leasehold interest in the entire parcel of
property owned by him in Snyderville, Utah,
7.

In late 1987, the Utah Department of

Transportation took possession of the land upon which the
billboards were situated.
8.

Defendant removed the billboards from the

locations they occupied upon the execution of the 1982 Lease
then moved them to other locations on plaintiffs1 property
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Lease executed by plaintiffs and defendant

dated February 1, 1982 is ambiguous as a whole.

For example,

under the interpretation of the Lease urged by defendant, the
Lease could never be terminated so long as there remained
sufficient undeveloped land upon which to position two
billboards.

The Lease, which was drafted by the defendant and

against whom ambiguous terms must be construed, appears to have
been prepared for the purpose of leasing property upon which
signs had not yet been erected.

2.

Under the terms of the Lease and consistent with

the intention of the parties, defendant was authorized to
maintain its billboards only on two specific locations and was
not authorized to move one or both to any other site on
plaintiffs' property.
3.

Defendant's relocation of its billboards on

plaintiffs' property other than that described in the Lease
constitutes a trespass.
4.

Defendant is ordered to remove the billboards now

located on plaintiffs' property no later than 45 days from the
date of the Judgment herein.
(,

DATED this

/ ) ^day of October, 1988
BY THE COURT:

Michael R. Murphy
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

Attorney for Defendants

TabF

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN W. JARMAN and HELEN B.
JARMAN,

MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
v.
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
COMPANY,

Civil No. 963 6
Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
defendant moves this Court to amend its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered on October 18, 1988, on the grounds
that there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support
said Findings and Conclusions.
This Motion is based on the points stated below, the files
and records of this action, and the evidence introduced during
trial.

Specifically, defendant objects to and requests that

the Court amend the following Findings and Conclusions.
Findings SISI 2 and 3.

In these paragraphs, the Court finds

that the February 1, 1982 Lease between the parties describes

"two specific locations" on the real property, and that the
preceding leases authorized the placement of one billboard
each "on a specific site."

These Findings are contrary to

the evidence at trial as follows:
(a)

The Lease by its terms describes approximate

locations for two signs along State Highway 224.
(b)

Terry Reed testified at trial that during the

negotiation of the February 1, 1982 Lease, Mr. Jarman expressed
concern over whether the Lease would continue in the event of
development or sale of the property.

Accordingly, these two

concerns were addressed in the Lease, which by its terms,
provides for relocation of the signs.

Specifically, the Lease

gives defendant the option to use the remaining portions of
property which are not developed.
(c)

While Mr. Reed testified that relocation was

discussed during the negotiations for the Lease, Mr. Jarmanfs
testimony was only that he could not recall whether it was
discussed or not.
Based on the foregoing, defendant asserts that the Lease
was not limited "to specific locations."
Finding f

4.

Here the Court states that "based upon the

testimony of Mr. Jarman that he intended to lease defendant
only the property upon which the billboards were situated,
the Court finds that the parties intended the Lease to continue
the right of the defendant to maintain the billboards in their

existing locations. These findings are incomplete based upon
the evidence at trial and should be amended to further state
that Mr. Jarman's intent was never communicated to defendant.
Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, defendant asserts
that the weight of the evidence supports its position that it
could maintain the billboards in their existing locations or
relocate them to other locations along the highway in the
event of development or sale.
Finding $ 5.

Defendant objects to the Court's finding

that the Lease is ambiguous. For the reasons set forth above,
it is defendant's position that the Lease specifically provides
for relocation and is not ambiguous as to the manner in which
the Lease can be terminated.
Finding $ 6.

Here the Court finds "that plaintiffs did

not intend to grant defendant a leasehold interest in the entire
parcel of property owned by him in Snyderville, Utah."

This

finding implies that it was defendant's position that it did
have a leasehold interest in the entire parcel of property.
Defendant did not urge such an interpretation of the Lease.
It is defendant's position that the Lease granted defendant
the right to maintain two signs along the road, which signs
could be relocated to other locations alongside the road if
the property on which the signs are currently located were
sold or developed.

The signs only have value if they are

located next to the road where they can be seen by passing

motorist-,

Defendant

did

rot

assert

t >

that

: - :!ouZ 1

relocate

'

vdS

liKr an easement wii.jri granted them Li — L lq.-i

^ ,.^>-ui'. two
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b e c a u s e t h e r e was e v i d e n c e t h a t t h i s w
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